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Abstract 
Today’s corporate environments are characterized by growing dynamics and uncertainties. Here, flexibility 
gains importance as a critical success factor. This is especially true for long-term customer-supplier 
relationships. As a solution to the mentioned uncertainties connected with such a business relationship, one 
can think of flexible systems. The contribution at hand focuses on contracts to control for customer-supplier 
relationships. By reallocating property rights in use-oriented business models it is possible to distribute 
incentives and risks to better balance the interests of customers and suppliers. Our contribution points out 
the importance of flexibility and describes the opportunity to detect the optimal degree of flexibility of an 
IPS². 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The change from a mere product business to selling 
customized problem solutions has lead to the 
establishment of terms such as business models, 
performance contracts, life cycle costs and product-
service systems. This conception, which focuses on 
securing sustained earnings through services besides the 
one-off sale of products, originates in the change of 
customers’ requirements and is driven to a great extent by 
the reallocation of risks and incentives. In a business 
environment characterized by increased uncertainty, the 
aspects “availability” and “flexibility” of an Industrial 
Product-Service System are thus of special significance.  
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Figure 1: Questions 
Here, the classical term “production system” is 
consciously replaced by the term “Industrial Product-
Service System” (IPSS) which, according to its definition, 
is characterized by a life-cycle-oriented integration of the 
industrial supply of products and service parts [1]. This 
substitution of the term which is discussed both in 
academic and in industrial circles as well as a currently 
high publication density regarding the issue of use-
oriented business models raises the following questions 
(figure 1):  
• What is the relationship between uncertainty, 
use-oriented business models and IPSS? 
• What is the significance of the aspect flexibility in 
use-oriented business models and how can 
flexibility be integrated into IPSS? 
• How can IPSS be designed in an economically 
sensible way and how can you quantify the value 
of flexibility of IPSS? 
 
2 UNCERTAINTY, USE-ORIENTED BUSINESS 
MODELS AND IPSS 
Contracts, which create an institutional framework within 
which rights, obligations and responsibilities are regulated, 
constitute the basis of a business relationship between the 
supplier and the customer. Thus, contracts determine 
business models and, depending on these, they can be of 
formal and/or informal nature, i.e. explicitly stipulate terms 
and/ or include implicit agreements. The design of 
contracts and, thus, of business models is, in particular, 
characterized by the factor "uncertainty". On account of 
"uncertainty", long-term contracts have to remain 
“incomplete” so that they provide room for opportunistic 
behaviour and therefore influence the players’ incentive to 
behave in the sense of the business relationship. Besides 
the negative consequences related to this uncertainty 
regarding conduct, the contracts' incompleteness offers 
the possibility to flexibly react to future environmental 
situations. Thus, uncertainty does not only generate risks, 
but also, most importantly, chances.  
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It is the aim of innovative business models to evenly 
spread risks, chances and incentives between the supplier 
and the customer [2]. In figure 2, the evolution of 
business models is depicted. The expansion of the 
spectrum of business models from the cost-plus to the 
use-oriented business model is rendered possible through 
innovative technologies, the rearrangement of the 
ownership of capital goods (customer ownership versus 
supplier ownership) and, in particular, through the 
expansion of industrial services. This directly affects the 
flows of accumulated costs (LCCi), revenues (LCRi) and 
profits (Pi). 
In cost-plus offers, industrial services are mainly only 
intended as add-on and are limited to the maintenance 
and servicing of certain components of the production 
system. Further services are merely optional, as the 
customer is the owner of the machine and is responsible 
for the availability of the machine. In this business model, 
the financial risk caused by a system failure is the 
responsibility of the customer and results in fluctuating 
life-cycle costs (LCC1) (figure 2). As the supplier does not 
assume any risk in this business model, he has no 
incentive to carry out sustained changes to the machine 
and to thus reduce the life-cycle costs. 
Fixed-price models, however, include the customer’s 
requirement that the product's life-cycle costs are 
guaranteed, depicted in the linear course of the LCC2 
curve in figure 2. This leads to the transition from a 
transaction-oriented, short-term business relationship to a 
relational, long-term business relationship [3] in which a 
substantial proportion of the risk of a failure is transferred 
to the supplier. In order to determine and/or reduce the 
risk of a failure and the costs related herewith, the supplier 
expands his industrial service offer and provides 
condition-oriented maintenance and servicing especially 
aligned to the machine. In the contrary to the cost-plus 
business model, it is necessary to integrate the 
development of products and services in this case. 
Through bundling product and industrial services, 
incentives have now, however, been created for the 
supplier to reduce the product-service system’s life-cycle 
costs, but not to increase the productivity of this system. 
Likewise, the customer has no incentive to operate the 
technical system in “manner which protects the material”. 
The comparison of cost-plus and fixed-price business 
models leads to the conclusion that a one-sided 
distribution of risks and incentives is no basis for solving 
the problem in a way which is ideal for both parties. Use-
oriented business models which go beyond existing 
approaches such as “use-oriented maintenance” [4] offer 
an approach for achieving an efficient distribution of risks 
and incentives. The difference lies in the title to the 
machine, whereby it no longer becomes the customer’s 
property but remains the property of the supplier. In this 
case, the range of the offer of these contracts reaches up 
to the “temporary availability” of a partial production 
system, at least in theory. Similar to the basic principle of 
a car rental service, it is intended to sell an availability 
service within a determined time interval to various 
customers in this case (figure 2). The temporary 
availability includes both the system’s guaranteed 
quantitative operational readiness and its availability in 
terms of location and time. Besides adapting the technical 
system, it is also necessary to extend the industrial 
service portfolio (logistics, ramp up, etc.) in order to 
ensure this. Through aligning the business partners’ 
interests, incentives are now created for the supplier to 
not only improve the service offer’s quality but also its 
productivity, whereby the flexibility of the product-service 
system required for implementing this business model 
takes advantage of the incompleteness of contracts. It 
becomes clear that product-service systems and use-
oriented business models are not to be understood as 
synonyms, but that they complement one another. 
 
3 RELATED LITERATURE: CLOSING THE GAP 
A great deal of literature has been dedicated to the 
problem of contract design both in the literature of 
economics and with regard to supply chain management. 
In the area of research of economics the theory of 
incomplete contracts deals with the question of how to 
design an optimal contractual relationship, so as to induce 
efficient transaction-specific investments (for a literature 
review see Schmitz [5]). According to this theory 
investments are made with aim of either reducing 
production costs or increasing the value of the good. The 
term “investment” does not only refer to financial aspects, 
but is used to describe all activities which increase the 
profitability of a business relationship. Selfish and 
Figure 2: Costs, revenues and profits of selected business models 
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 cooperative investments need to be distinguished. While 
selfish investments from the supplier’s point of view aim at 
reducing production costs, cooperative investments result 
in an increased value of the good. Industrial services such 
as maintenance and repair can in this regard be classified 
as cooperative investments.    
Renegotiations which take place after uncertainties 
regarding the environment have dissolved implicate 
underinvestments in this theory. These result from the 
fact, that while the investing party needs to cover the 
costs of its investment alone, it has to share the surplus 
by renegotiation with the other party (hold-up problem). 
Renegotiations therefore may have negative economic 
consequences.  
Contrary to this, contract analysis in supply chain 
management (SCM) focuses on investments in capacity 
and inventory (for an overview over supply chain contracts 
see Tsay, Nahmias and Agrawal [6]). The basic difference 
between these lines of argumentation is the modeling of 
renegotiations which forms no part of the SCM-literature. 
Rather, in return to a commitment customers obtain the 
flexibility to revise their initial decision conditional on 
updated information in subsequent periods. Risks are 
thereby implicitly transferred to the supplier. For example 
with so called „quantity flexibility contracts“ customers 
have to communicate ex ante forecasts of their estimated 
demands to suppliers. These can be adjusted ex post 
after the market demand has been realized. To earn this 
right the customer has to ex ante commit to a minimum 
purchase quantity. Other contract forms distinguish 
between the reservation of capacity and its actual usage.  
As is the case in the SCM-literature, aspects of flexibility 
and contract design are a central part of our contribution. 
In contrast to an analysis on the level of components, 
which is the focus of the previously described literature, 
we concentrate on the system’s level. In this context, in 
addition to the reallocation of incentives and risks through 
contracts the problem of “product architecture” gains 
importance. Baiman et al. examine the interplay of 
performance measures for contract design, the product 
architecture and incentive efficiency in a supply chain [7]. 
Their results show that when choosing a product 
architecture not only consequences of manufacturability 
need to find consideration, but also the incentive efficiency 
of the whole supply chain. However, they do not consider 
aspects of flexibility and services in their contribution. 
In the following, this article neglects the strategic 
interaction between supplier and customer and focuses on 
the development of the system and its flexibility. We 
motivate this approach because, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the choice of the use-oriented business 
model creates the “right” incentives for suppliers. 
Consequently, the incomplete character of contracts is 
seen as an opportunity and not a risk of opportunistic 
behavior. What needs to be discussed is the degree of 
flexibility IPSS must have, in order to realize future 
opportunities when delivering the system.        
 
4 SIGNIFICANCE OF FLEXIBILITY AND ITS 
INTERGATION INTO IPSS 
Below, the aspect of “flexibility” which is frequently 
discussed in literature will be dealt with and brought into 
relation with IPSS (compare [8]). For the time being, we 
shall shelve the definition of the term in favour of a 
general contemplation. 
Figure 3 points out the initial problem. In today’s 
development decision (t0), uncertain values of tomorrow 
(t1) flow in along the life cycle which can be bundled in the 
development risk. 
In this case, the interplay of the risk factors “technology", 
“market” and “customer” represent both endogenous and 
exogenous factors which will affect the industrial product- 
service bundle in future. 
Here, it becomes evident that, besides aspects such as 
uncertainty regarding the further development of a 
technology or fluctuating sales volumes required by the 
market, in particular instable customer preferences 
increase the development risk [9]. In order to reduce this, 
Figure 3: Development risks and possibilities to reduce risks 
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alternative solution mechanisms exist which are depicted 
in the bottom half of figure 3. On the one hand, the period 
of contemplation and/or the life cycle (on behalf of a 
service) can be shortened to, in particular, reduce the risk 
implied by the market and the technology. On the other 
hand, there is the possibility to invest more time into 
examining the uncertainty in order to take the likelihood of 
future environmental situations occurring as well as their 
effect into account when developing goods. On account of 
relational contracts' being of a long-term nature and the 
systems becoming more complex for integration reasons, 
these mechanisms are, however, not sufficient for 
reducing the risk involved in the development of Industrial 
Product-Service Systems. 
In combination with the incompleteness of use-oriented 
service contracts, it is of great importance to take the third 
mechanism, the system’s changeability, into account, 
whereby changeability is generally understood as the 
ability of a system to react to relevant changes induced by 
the system or the environment by means of available 
internal or external factors [10]. As you can see in figure 
4, robustness, flexibility, adaptability and agility (flexibility 
in a broader sense) are immanent components of 
changeability according to Fricke and Schultz [11]. 
However, it only makes sense to use these differentiations 
regarding the terms, which are partially extended by the 
aspect of reconfigurability, in combination with defined 
system boundaries. As this article is based on a 
superordinate understanding of changeability and, in 
particular, the character of the possibility to act is intended 
to be emphasized, the term “flexibility” is used below. 
There are many possibilities for integrating flexibility into a 
system, whereby especially the aspect of modularisation 
comes into the fore, besides principles such as the 
independence of the system's elements, the reduction of 
the system's complexity or non-hierarchic coupling [11]. 
As, according to Wiendahl [12], modularisation is 
understood to be the substantial enabler of flexibility in 
production technology, the idea seems reasonable to also 
apply this approach with regard to designing the 
architecture of Industrial Product-Service Systems. 
Besides the production-oriented approaches of Schuh et 
al. [13], the modularisation approach for industrial 
services according to Böhmann et al. [14] must be 
mentioned in this context, whereby the modularisation of 
Industrial Product-Service Systems also provides for 
integrated hybrid modules, besides mere products or 
service modules. 
 
5 VALUE-ORIENTED DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT 
OF IPSS 
To this point, the explanations have revealed that in 
particular in the context of Industrial Product-Service 
Systems increased significance is placed on the strategic 
success factor “flexibility” in product development. 
Generally, technical methods do, however, follow the 
simple heuristic “more flexibility is good”. In this section, a 
superordinate reference value shall be introduced with the 
economic value by means of which the process of 
determining the ideal degree of flexibility, i.e. the 
assessment of the value contribution of flexibility, can be 
supported. Baldwin and Clark [15] stipulate in a similar 
context "Designers see and seek value flexibility in new 
designs" and Sullivan et al. [16] interpret the design 
and/or the development process to be “one of investing 
valuable resources under uncertainty with the goal of 
maximising value added”. In this context, establishing 
flexibility in Industrial Product-Service Systems implies 
increased investments which are caused by an increased 
use of resources on the one hand and opportunity costs 
due to opportunities of alternative allocation of resources 
which have not been seized, on the other hand (figure 2). 
The higher the economic costs for adapting a product are, 
the lower is flexibility. Thus, the ideal extent of flexibility is 
a parameter of the economic trade-off of high pre-
production costs and low follow-up costs. 
In this context, controlling has the task of planning, 
steering and coordinating the establishment of flexibility in 
development, whereby the challenge lies in assessing the 
economic value of flexibility, whereas it is relatively easy 
to quantify the costs related to establishing flexibility. The 
economic value of flexibility is the result of the ability to 
react to changing conditions in the future. Thus, the 
payment flows related to this depend on the uncertain 
future conditions. 
Figure 4: Four aspects of changeability 
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 Traditional assessment procedures of investment planning 
and budgeting (e.g. net present value method) or of cost 
management (e.g. target cost management) are no longer 
sufficient against this setting, as assumptions regarding 
an expected scenario of payment flows are implicitly 
related with them [17]. The respective restrictions of these 
instruments, which literature classifies as deterministic, 
result in the investment object being systematically 
underrated and lead to the real option approach being 
recommended (figure 5). A key finding of this approach is 
that increased uncertainty of the payment flows triggered 
by the investment increases the value of flexibility and/or 
the value of the real option.  
However, frequently there is a lack of flexibility to carry out 
actions at a later date at an adequate cost if the Industrial 
Product-Service System has not been designed for this 
purpose from the beginning. In the following section, the 
idea of the real option approach will be presented and 
transferred to the development of Industrial Product-
Service Systems. 
 
6 THE REAL-OPTION APPROACH FOR ASSESSING 
FLEXIBILITY 
An option is defined as the right, but not the obligation to 
purchase (call) or sell (put) a specified asset (a share, a 
contract or a design) at a price stipulated in advance 
(basic price or exercise price) within an agreed period of 
time (term of the option). The right to only exercise an 
option if it is in the interest of the option holder implies an 
asymmetric spread of risks of payment flows (figure 5). 
Thus, options differ from contracts which include the 
obligation to purchase or sell an item of property at 
specified conditions in the future from today on [18]. 
Therefore symmetric payment flows, which can develop 
both positively and negatively are involved in contracts. 
Due to the options' asymmetric characteristic, risks can be 
limited on the one hand and chances arising in the future 
can be used on the other hand. Against this setting, there 
is the wish for more uncertainty so that the option's value 
increases. 
On the contrary to financial options which are traded in 
financial markets and for which there are elaborate 
assessment procedures, real options relate to real items, 
such as design, technologies or production processes 
[15]. Typical options existing in business practice are: 
• the defer option, which describes the possibility 
of deferring investment until new information is 
received, 
• the abandonment option, with which the 
investment can be carried out stepwise and, if 
necessary, be called off, 
• the expansion or contracting option, which 
provides the possibility of adapting the extent of 
the investment as well as, 
• the switching option, which enables its holder to 
change the way an item of property functions 
(e.g. to the input or output of a flexible production 
plant) [17]. 
 
There are certain similarities between financial and real 
options. For example, if the interim results did not meet 
expectations, the  abandonment option of an r&d project 
can be compared with a call option in the financial market 
which has not been exercised if the value of the object 
offered under subscription is below the exercise price. 
Despite certain similarities, there are, however, significant 
differences in the investment environment which make it 
difficult to directly apply the assessment methods for 
financial options to real options [18], as the application of 
these procedures requires a complete capital market in 
which the uncertainty of the investment through traded 
assets can be duplicated. The risk within the development 
processes is, however, of private nature and cannot be 
represented in the market. Thus, the approach of dynamic 
programming is pursued in literature - an approach which 
does not require this strict assumption, but which is, 
however, not able to determine the correct, risk-adjusted 
interest rate [19]. Finally, instead of looking at the 
assessment procedures, we shall examine how the idea of 
service bundling is dealt with in the context of an option-
based conception. 
The IPSS is to be understood as a portfolio of assets 
whose value is determined by options [16]. It is the aim to 
treat the flexibility of an IPSS as an option and therefore 
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Figure 5: Taking flexibility through options into account 
be able to quantify it easily. According to the explanations 
in section 3, options are generated through as system’s 
architecture. As this is, however, frequently determined 
through technical decisions in practice, the maximization 
of the value added of an Industrial Product-Service 
System is possibly not given. Thus, the modularization 
does possess a value through creating a portfolio of 
options which, if you assume that the aggregated value 
function remains the same, supersedes the value of an 
option on a portfolio [16]. However, negative (economic) 
consequences must be expected with an over or under-
modularisation [20]. By means of the real-option 
approach, the ideal strategy, i.e. the decision regarding 
the ideal number of modules can be supported here. 
Besides duplicating the options in form of a "mix & match" 
of modules, there is also the possibility to change this 
locally, i.e. to exercise the options described above on 
individual modules. 
 
7 SUMMARY  
The contracts for regulating customer-supplier relations 
which remain incomplete on account of being of a long-
term nature and therefore being uncertain imply problems 
regarding incentives and thus inefficiencies. In particular, 
through re-allocating property rights it is possible to 
spread incentives and risks more evenly in use-oriented 
business models and to align the customer’s and the 
supplier’s interests. Thus, the leeway which exists thanks 
to the incompleteness of contracts is not understood as a 
risk, but rather as a chance which can be seized through 
correspondingly developing a flexible IPSS. The article 
reveals the significance of flexibility and describes the 
possibility of determining the value and therefore the ideal 
extent of flexibility of such a system by means of the real-
option approach. In particular, through determining both 
the business model and the IPSS, it can be ascertained 
that these are not synonyms, but two constructs which 
complement one another. 
Future research needs a combined view on IPSS and their 
related innovative business models. The objective is to 
have a better understanding of the relation between the 
(architecture of an) IPSS and the business model. A first 
approach was provided by Richter and Steven who specify 
the dominance of use- and result-oriented models subject 
to the complexity of product design [21].  
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